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I. INTRODUCTION

The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or the Code) draftmg
and revision processes are under siege; critics of the Code's formulat10n of fundamental rules and pnnciples are attackmg the
conventions of the sponsors of the uniform commercial law and

* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and
Mary. Professor Alces IS a member of the Amencan Law Institute (ALI) and the
Amencan Bar Association (ABA). He IS the Association of Amencan Law Schools
(AALS) LiaISon to the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 ReVISion Committee. He
represents the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM) at
meetings of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 ReVISion Committee. He does
not represent that group at the meetings of the Article 9 Revision Committee. The
views expressed m thIS Article are those of the Authors alone and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the ALI, ABA, AALS, or AIAM. The Authors are grateful to
Professor Robert Hillman for h1S comments on an earlier draft of thIS Article.
** Professor of Law, Widener Umversity School of Law. Professor Fnsch is a
member of the ABA and ALI. He IS the ABA adVISor to the UCC Article 2 ReVISion
Committee.
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the deliberat10ns of the study and draftmg committees charged
with modermzmg the commercial law 1 Tins Article responds
to the mdictment leveled by two particularly mfluential critics-Dean Robert E. Scott2 and Professor Alan Schwartz3-as
their work relates to the current proJect to reVIse Article 9 of
the Code concernmg "Secured Transact10ns"-loans agamst
collateral.4
While the Umform Commercial Code draftmg and reVIsion
processes may be flawed, obscunng deficiencies m the status quo
by discovenng "false positives" frustrates rather than serves the
crucial goal of accomplishmg meanmgful reform. Ultimately,
commentators who mIS1dentify deficiencies mask real shortcommgs and, m fact, may exacerbate the problems of the current
system.
Each of the Authors has been mvolved m Uniform Commercial Code draftmg and reVIs10n proJects over the course of the
last fifteen years. 5 The actors and entities responsible for mamtaimng the mtegrity of the system have not conspired to formulate rules that perpetrate mJustice. In fact, a trend seems to
have ansen toward greater balance m the commercial law than
has ever before been realized m Anglo-Amencan JUTISprudence.

1. See, e.g., Connne Cooper, The Madonnas Play Tug of War with the Whores or
Who Is Saving the UCC?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563 (1993); Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from
the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Donald J. Rapson, Who
Is Looking Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts About the UCC Revision Process in
the Light (and Shadows) of Professor Rubin's Observations, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249
(1994); Edward L. Rubm, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some
Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743
(1993).
2. Dean, Lewis F Powell, Jr., Professor of Law, and Arnold H. Leon Professor of
Law, Uruversity of Virgirua.
3. Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
4. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80
VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994).
5. The Authors are members of the ALI and the ABA and have participated m
those groups' deliberations concerning revision of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Professor Alces was the Chair of the ABA Task Force studying the Article 9 Filing
System. Professor Frisch 1s the ABA's advisor to the Article 2 Revision Committee.
As counsel to the AIAM, Professor Alces has attended the meetings of the Article 2
Rev1s10n Committee.
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This Article takes account of the forces that shape reVIs1ons of
the commercial law and notes the relationship between those
forces and the tenor of the resultmg codification; Part II peruses
Scott's thesis. It responds to his criticism of the UCC draftmg
and reVIsion processes and describes how uniform commercial
law Jurisprudence reveals the mcongruities m his analysis. Part
III tests Scott's conclusions about pnvate legislatures6 by considenng the realist Jurisprudence of the UCC and compares the
UCC's "pnvate legislature" (PL) commercial law to the commercial-law product of a "public legislature," the Bankruptcy Code
promulgated by the United States Congress. Part IV focuses on
the aspects of the Article 9 reVIsion that Scott used to illustrate the operation of the Schwartz and Scott thesis-the filing
system, purchase money security mterests, and proceeds of
collateral.7

II. THE SCO'IT THESIS

IN A NUTSHELL

Scott argues that special mterests dommate uniform commercial law reVIsion because the process lacks the system of checks
and balances proVIded by public legislatures. 8 ReVIsion efforts
therefore develop commercial law that serves those special mterests at the expense of constituencies impotent to protect their
nghts. 9 Scott endeavors to substantiate his criticism of the pnvate legislatures that compose the Uniform Commercial Code by
reVIewmg the draft proVIsions of reVIsed Article 9, specifically
the sections that proVIde "Rules That Advantage Financmg Insiders"10 and Article 9 filing system rules "That Advantage Less
Informed Creditors."11 According to Scott, the measure of UCC
6. Scott, supra D,ote 4, at 1810-22.
7. Id. at 1829-38.
8. Because Article 9 regulates asset-based financers, a paradigmatic example
of well-orgamzed and cohesive mterests, the process is susceptible to
disproportionate mfluence by a smgle active mterest group representing
particular financmg mterests. In such a case, I suggest that the law
revision process will tend to propose rules that are both transactionally
efficient and distributionally favorable to the dommating mterests.
Id. at 1850.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1795.
11. Id. at 1799.
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draftmg mequity is the extent to which those two sections vmdicate special mterests at the expense of parties who would be
better represented m a public legislature. 12 This section will
first treat the prermses supporting Scott's critique of the pnvate
legislature model of UCC revision.
A. "Logrolling Is Very Difficult"13

Scott describes "logrolling" as the practice of legislators' tradmg one legislative provision for another. 14 For example, m a
public legislature, a representative from a tobacco state rmght
agree to support public transportation funding for a state with a
concentrated urban population m return for the urban
legislator's prormse to vote agamst mcreased cigarette taxes.
Logrolling makes no claim to moral supenority over other ways
of reaching an agreement, but it does provide a means of getting
things done. Scott argues that the pnvate legislators mvolved m
UCC draftmg processes "cannot typically resolve disputes by
agreemg
to trade one Article 9 provis10n for another." 15 He
does acknowledge, however, the possibility of trade-offs within
particular provisions. 16
Scott's descnpt1on of this type of "trade" does not address the
fairness of the rule that results from a regime with no, or less,
logrolling. Logrolling m public legislatures may serve the mterests of legislators by pleasmg the constituencies that will vote
to keep them m office but may do little or perhaps nothing to
improve the broader society A net societal loss might well result if Virgima farmers grow and sell more tobacco, even though
New York obtams funding for public transportation proJects.
Assummg that the transportation funding is a good idea, it is
difficult to see why more people should die of cancer at substantial cost to nonsmokers so that New York can obtain that fundmg. Indeed, if that type of qmd pro quo is the hallmark of a
12. See id. at 1830-31.
13. Id. at 1812.
14. Id.
15. Id. The lustocy of commercial-law drafting, if it proves anything, proves that
the ALI and the National Conference of Comm1ss1oners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) do get things done.
16. Id.
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public legislature, the UCC pnvate legislature model rmght well
be preferable. 17
Even assuming that logrolling rmproves the legislative process, consider Scott's conclusion, without citation of any authonty whatsoever, that pnvate legislators will make trades withm
provisions but will not trade one provision for another. 18 That
matter of form should not deterrmne substance. For example,
under Scott's pesslllllstic view of special mterests, would not a
manufacturer of goods for ultimate sale to consumers be mclined
to trade the scope of warranty protection for the substance of
warranty protection? That is, if the warranty section says that
buyers may recover consequential damages from sellers upon
certam types of breach, why would an adjustment to the warranty disclarmer provisions not vindicate seller mterests?
Scott's arguments m support of ms logrolling conclusion are
not convmcmg. He suggests that study group members work on
discrete projects and are not m a position to trade, for example,
a sales provision for a secured transactions provision: "Study
groups are asked to draft smgle projects and are disrmssed when
the projects are completed."19 In fact, many of the same people
are active m more than one UCC revision project, either as
members of study committees or as participants m the open
draftmg committee meetings.20 Of course, that degree of participation does not necessarily guarantee more balanced legislation,
but it does ensure that the attorney argumg for a particular
provision m one enactment is considerate of that provision's

17. For a companson of the congressional lawmakmg process with the NCCUSL
model, see Carlyle C. Ring, The UCC Process-Consensus and Balance, 28 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 287, 305-07 (1994).
18. Scott, supra note 4, at 1812.
19. Id.
20. Because the NCCUSL and the ALI concern themselves with more than JUSt
the commercial law, not all of the members of those groups are active ~ the commercial-law projects. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 600-02 (describmg the
makeup and procedures of the ALI and NCCUSL); see also HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS NINETY-EIGHTH YEAR 35-50
(William S. Hem & Co. 1994) (listing members of all of NCCUSL's special committees). Therefore, a limited number of NCCUSL commissioners and AEI members
have a particular mterest m the UCC and compnse either the drafting or adVIsory
committees.
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cooperation with parallel provis10ns. While an actual "trade"
may not occur-for example, the exchange of.a commercial mterest provis10n for a consumer mterest section ma different article-more coordinat10n exists between parallel enactments than
Scott acknowledges. 21
Scott's most glaring error with regard to the composition of
draftmg committees relates to the expertise of the committee
members: "Draftmg committee members, however, are chosen
because they are 'experts,' not because they represent the larger
bodies, and the larger bodies have almost no v01ce m selectmg
the committee members or the reporters." 22 Of course, it would
be cunous mdeed if the members of legislative draftmg committees were selected for their ignorance rather than for their general familiarity with the commercial law 23 Further reason exists, however, to consider skeptically Scott's observations.
The members of the Uniform Commercial Code draftmg committees are selected from the membership of the NCCUSL, an
organization compnsed of political appomtees. 24 Evidence sug-

2i. To a considerable extent, this coordination results from a blurring of the lines
that distinguish the scope of parallel commercial enactments. For example, although
Article 2 of the UCC applies to the sale of goods, Article 2A applies to leases of
personal property. Many of the prov1s10ns m the two articles track one another, and
the comments to Article 2A acknowledge when it departs from the sales law formulation of a rule to conform Article 2A with leasmg practices. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A201 cmt. (1994):
Changes: This section is modeled on Section 2-201, with changes to reflect the differences between a lease contract and a contract for the sale
of goods. In particular, subsection (l)(b) adds a reqwrement that the
writing "describe the goods leased and the lease term," borrowmg that
concept, with rev1s1ons, from the prov1s1ons of Section 9-203(1)(a). Subsection (2), relymg on the statutory analogue m Section 9-110, sets forth the
m1rumum criterion for satisfymg that reqwrement.
Id. This comment also reveals the relationship among the sales, lease, and personal
property security regimes of the UCC. Further, the commentary to other Article 2A
prov1s1ons concernmg consumer protection cites analogous Uniform Consumer Credit
Code proV1s1ons. See, e.g., id. §§ 2A-108 to -109.
22. Scott, supra note 4, at 1812-13.
23. For a discussion of the benefits of expertise m the drafting of commercial
legislation, see Ring, supra note 17, at 306-07.
24. Scott, supra note 4, at 1805. Dean Scott erroneously asserts that the more
than 300 Comm1ss1oners that comprise the NCCUSL are "appomted on a nonpolitical
basis." Id. at 1804. Insofar as elected political officials m the states, most often the
governors, appomt the commissioners, no reason exists for believmg that the same
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gests that the members of the draftmg committees are selected,
to an extent, on the basis of the geographic diversity that they
will bnng to the proJect. 25 That select10n critenon is crucial to
the enactment effort once the proJect is fl.rushed. Legislatures m
the different regions of the country are more likely to enact
legislation beanng the impnmatur of drafters who have their
region's parochial mterests m mmd.
In addition, Scott is not completely accurate when he says
that the members of the draftmg committees are experts. The
members of the draftmg committees for Articles 2 and 9 are not
the leading sales and secured transactions attorneys m the country To a considerable extent, they are representatives of different legal perspectives rather than leading commercial-law scholars.26 The membership of these committees was set when Scott
wrote his article, but he offers no concrete examples to support
his maccurate generalizations.

B. "PL Members Act As Individuals and Have No Independent
Political Power'127
Scott pomts out that the NCCUSL and the ALI are not political orgaruzat10ns m the partisan sense. 28 He concludes, therefore, that the ALI and the NCCUSL "need mterest group support, or at least the absence of mterest group opposit10n, to en-

political considerations that dnve gubematonal appointments generally do not dictate
these appointments. Dean Scott offered no support, anecdotal or othel"Wlse, for his
assertion that officials make these political appointments on a nonpolitical basis.
25. For example, consider the geographic diversity of the members of the Article 9
Revision Committee: William M. Burke, Chair, California; William S. Arnold, Arkansas; Manon Benfield, California; Trudi Bird, Connecticut; Dale G. Higer, Idaho; William C. Hillman, Massachusetts; Randal C. Picker, Illino1S; Donald J. Rapson, New
Jersey; Harry C. Sigman, California; Bradley Y. Smith, New York; Edwin E. Smith,
Massachusetts; Sandra S. Stem, New York; Steven L. Harris, Reporter, Illinois;
Charles W Mooney, Reporter, Pennsylvania. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 9. PARTS 4 AND 5 (WITH CONFORMING AND
MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS TO SECTIONS 1-102, 9-105, AND 9-318) (Draft, Feb. 10,
1995).
26. On the Article 2 Committee, for example, Commissioner Langrock frequently
raises ISsues of concern to tnal lawyers, and Professor Spanogle is an international
business law scholar.
27. Scott, supra note 4, at 1813.
28. Id.
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sure the passage of their proposals by state legislators."29 That
observation certamly is accurate and is borne out by UCC experience, particularly m the case of enactments that would order
the rights of strong constituencies versus the mterests of weaker
groups. 30 Strong and well-orgamzed mterest groups, such as
banks, would be m a posit10n to block state enactment of commercial legislation perceived as too mdulgent of the rights of
less orgamzed and, therefore, less powerful mterest groups, such
as consumers and small busmess mterests. 31
This asymmetry between the mfluence of groups on opposite
sides of the debate over commercial legislation has frustrated
the uniform commercial law from the time of Karl Llewellyn's
VISIOn of the UCC.32 That the NCCUSL and the ALI have done
any worse JOb m adjusting for that asymmetry than have more
"political" mstitutions, such as the United States Congress, is
not at all clear. 33 Such a comparison is the test of the UCC
draftmg process.

C. "There Are Information Asymmetries Between PL Committees
and Study Groups and the Membership at Large'rJA
According to Scott, the members of the NCCUSL and ALI
draftmg committees are "experts" m the area of law that is the
subJect of the committees' deliberations.35 That conclusion is

29. Id. at 1813-14.
30. Consider, m tlus regard, the conclusions of Professors Beutel and Gilmore with
regard to the ongmal Article 4 of the UCC. Fredenck K Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 361-62 (1952)
(clamung that Article 4 "was drafted entirely with the purpose of protecting the
banks so that they could carry on their busmess at the nsk of the customer" and
calling it "a deliberate sell-out
to the bank lobby"); Grant Gilmore, The Uniform
Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 376 (1952) (argumg
that "[s]ection 4-103 goes far beyond what lS wise or permissible m allowing banks
to rewrite the law their way whenever things get tough").
31. See Beutel, supra note 30; Gilmore, supra note 30.
32. For a descnption of and commentary on Llewellyn's mvolvement m the draftmg of the UCC, see Eugene F Mooney, Old Kontract Pnnciples and Karl's New
Kode: An Essay on the Junsprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV.
213 (1966).
33. See infra part III.B.
34. Scott, supra note 4, at 1814.
35. Id., see supra notes 22-25 and accompanymg text.
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sometlnng of an overstatement and, as well, is rmsleading m its
construct10n of the term "expertise." Scott also states that because the members of the pnvate legislatures of the ALI and the
NCCUSL know little about the subJect matter of the draftmg
committees' work, they are at the mercy of the members of the
draftmg committee and cannot reach mformed conclusions on
their own.36
Scott does not cite the composition of any particular draftmg
committee to support tlns portion of Ins critique. 37 If he had
considered carefully the memberslnp of particular draftmg committees, he likely would have found a combmation of experts on
discrete subtopics witlnn the scope of the draftmg proJects and
generalists familiar with a maJority of the legal contexts affected
by the draft law He also would have found that both the ALI
and NCCUSL committees mcluded members with no particular
expertise m the subJect matter of the draft. 38 Presumably, they
are appomted because they serve as effective bellwethers to
mdicate the strategic strong pomts of the draft not Immediately
accessible to the sponsonng orgamzations' memberslnp-at-large.
Semority does not deterrmne the memberslnp of the draftmg
committees, although effective service on other committees does
matter. Why memberslnp based on representation of an mterest
group-certamly the case with congressional committees-would
yield better, more balanced law than would memberslnp based
on the critena applied by the ALI and the NCCUSL is not immediately clear.
Scott concludes that the members of a PL "unlike members of
a typical legislature
have little mcentive to become more
39
educated before voting." That assertion follows from Scott's
observation that
the typical umnformed PL member seeks to maxnmze the

36. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1814 ("[T]he median PL member knows little about
the subject matter of any particular drafting project.").
37. See zd. at 1814-15.
38. The Reporter for the ongmal Article 3 of the UCC, Professor William Prosser,
was appomted to that position precisely because he would not bnng any biases to
the process. Saia Mentschikoff, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 537, 542
(1982). He was a torts scholar and not an expert m commercial paper law. Id.
39. Scott, supra note 4, at 1814.
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public good (as she conceives of it) subJect to several constramts: (1) that her pnvate mterest-for example, her law
practice-is not directly unpaired; (2) that her reputat10n for
, good Judgment is not unpaired; and (3) that she spends little
tune on PL busmess.40

The result of that state of affairs, Scott asserts, is model law
consistent with the position of the most promment mterest
group. 41 Alternatively, when competit10n exists between two
mfluential mterest groups, either mamtenance of the status quo
or an accommodation of the conflicting positions may result. 42
Scott reaches those conclusions without reference to any particular issue, controversial or otherwise, treated on the floor of the
annual meetmgs of the ALI or the NCCUSL. In fact, Scott's
description of the process is not consistent with the Authors'
impressions of both groups' annual meetings. Members who take
issue with a draft's treatment of a matter distribute position
papers, and real, substantial debate takes place concerning the
drafters' accommodation of divergent views. 43 The processes as

40. Id. at i814-15. Scott would do well to heed Carlyle Ring's warrung that
it should not be forgotten that ultimately each uniform act must be enacted state-by-state, and thus 15 subJected to review by experts and mterested members of the public m that process. But if the NCCUSL has
done its JOb well, the commiss10ners from each state have worked to
make the act suitable for enactment m their state, and recogruzmg that
uniformity must be a compromise consensus that grows from diversity of
thought and expenence, the act should be appropnate for enactment
without amendment.
Ring, supra note 17, at 307.
41. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1790.
42. Id. at 1815.
43. See Harry C. Sigman, Improving the UCC Revision Process: Two Specific Proposals, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 325, 326 n.9 (1994) ("I note with pnde that the Califorma Bar UCC Committee
delivered to an NCCUSL annual meeting a paper
advocating repeal of Article 6
I believe that paper was highly mfluential m
persuading the Conference the followmg year to adopt that proposal."). Carlyle Ring
has observed that:
From its earliest days, the practice of the NCCUSL has been to read
word-by-word every section of the draft and to discuss the draft sectionby-section at a mmimum of two annual meetings. For mstance, Article
4A was read at three annual meetings, consummg substantial floor time
with questions, comments, and motions from the floor on specific elements. Similarly, at the annual meeting of the ALI m 1989, the draft
was considered by the full membership of the ALI for their mput, ques-
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they are currently constituted are not a panacea, but Scott's
conclusions lack a realistic referent.
D. "Members of the Drafting Committees and Study Groups
Tend To Have Stronger Preferences for Revision Than the
Median PL Member'>44
Scott asserts that both acadermc1ans and the members of
draftmg committees, who necessarily, m ms view, represent
mterest groups, favor revision over mamtenance of the status
quo. 45 The draftmg committee members who represent mterest
groups seek legislation that will skew the law m favor of their
constituents, and acadermcs favor revision because it gives them
something to write about, wmch 1s, after all, what acadermcs do
for a living.46 The two prongs of that conclus10n are fatally
flawed. First, Scott offers no concrete emp1ncal evidence to establish that members of the draftmg committees represent mterest groups favoring revision. 47 In fact, the mterest groups that
would be profoundly affected by any revision of Article 2 neither
have representatives on the draftmg committees nor any demonstrated enthusiasm for revision of Article 2. 48 Further, Scott's

tions, and critique.
Ring, supra note 17, at 298.
44. Scott, supra note 4, at 1815.
45. Id. at 1815-16. Sitting Judges also participate as members of drafting committees. See Ring, supra note 17, at 294. The mterest group served by the Judiciary is
not clear, and Scott does not make it any clearer.
46. "[Academics] have an mstitutional commitment to reform because most law
professors earn reputations by writing articles about how the law can be improved,
rather than by defending the status quo." Scott, supra note 4, at 1816.
47. See ui. at 1816-22.
48. The correspondence to the Article 2 Revision Committee from the large manufacturing mterests has urged the Committee to mamtam the status quo and not to
disturb the fundamental commercial practices that have evolved smce the promulgation of the ongmal UCC. See, e.g., Letter from Michael J. Altier, Vice President &
Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Retail Fed'n, to Nat'l Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform State
Laws (Apr. 19, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter from Carl Edwards, Jr., Lennox
Int'l Inc., to Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, Nat'l Conference of Comm'ners of
Uniform State Laws (Dec. 19, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter from Steven C.
Hoffman, Semor Corporate Attorney, Caterpillar, Inc., to Edith 0. Davies, Executive
Secretary, Uniform Law Comm'ners (Dec. 14, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter
from Darnel L. Jaffe, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc., to Members of the Conference
(July 24, 1995) (on file with Authors); Letter from Frank T. Judge III, Assistant
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conclusions about the motives of acadermcians are cyrucal. He
fails to appreciate that law teachers can write as much about
what 1s wrong with the law as they can about revisions of the
law
Despite the defic1enc1es of his prermses, however, Scott's conclusion 1s not off the mark; drafting committees prefer domg
something over domg nothing. That tendency, however, may
well reflect nothing more than their perception of madequac1es
m the current law and an estimation of their ability to rmprove
the law There 1s simply no reason to believe that the urge to
reform 1s a function of mterest group pressure or acadermc efforts to make work.
Notwithstanding his perceptions of mterest group and acadermc motives, Scott concludes that the outcome of most PL
processes will be a conservative a<;ljustment of the status quo,
unless the members of the drafting committee can convince the
members of the ALI and the NCCUSL that the current law
warrants more aggressive changes. 49 That really 1s a
nonconclus1on, m that it says nothing about the PL process that
meamngfully distingmshes it from the public lawmakmg process. It also does nothing to reveal any madequacy m the ALI
and the NCCUSL as mstruments of commercial-law revision.

Gen. Counsel & Assistant Secretary, Timex Corp., to Edith 0. Davies, Executive
Secretary, Nat'l Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform State Laws (Dec. 22, 1994) (on
file with Authors); Letter from D.G. Lautz, Seruor Counsel, Modine Mfg. Co., to
Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, Nat'l Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform
State Laws (Dec. 20, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter from Charles H. Lockwood,
II, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Ass'n of Int'l Automobile Manufacturers, Inc., to
Members of the Drafting Comm. of UCC ReV1Sed Article 2 (Mar. 3, 1995) (on file
with Authors); Letter from George S. Pappayliou, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Tomkins
Indus., Inc., to Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, Nat'! Conference of Comm'ners
on Uniform State Laws (Dec. 19, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter from Jill Steps,
Gen. Counsel, & Mitch Eisenberg, Attorney, Burntly Corp., to Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, Nat'! Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform Laws (Dec. 21, 1994) (on
file with Authors).
49. Scott, supra note 4, at 1816.
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III. TESTING SCOTT'S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE PRIVATE
LEGISLATURE AND COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION
From the foregomg prermses, Scott concludes that the PL
process is more susceptible to the mfluence of mterest groups
than is the public lawmakmg process.50 Presumably, then, Congress and the state legislatures would devise better commercial
law than do the ALI and the NCCUSL.

A. "Precision" in the Uniform Commercial Code
Scott asserts that the way to test for the presence of a dormnant mterest group and the permc1ous effects of that group on
the PL process is to look for "precise, clear, bnght-line rules" m
the draft legislation. "[P]rec1se rules reduce the mdustry's costs
of compliance with the rules, and, if they are rules that help
the mdustry, give the mterpreters of the rules (i.e., Judges) less
ability to read the rule m a way contrary to the mdustry's
interest."51
Aspects of that argument are, mdeed, cunous. Certamly, a
dormnant mterest group will not favor a bnght-line rule that
operates m a manner mcons1stent with the group's mterest-such as a rule that mvalidates a disclaimer of liability for
personal mJury 52 None of the position papers submitted to the
Article 2 Revision Committee so far, however, obJects to that
rule m the current version of Article 2. Further, m certain circumstances, a dormnant mterest group will favor a more flexible
standard than that provided by a bnght-line rule, as m the case
of the subJective good faith standard m negotiable instruments
law Financial mstitutions m favor of maintaimng the subJective
standard argued that the adoption of an obJective standard
would freeze commercial practices.53 Bnght-line rules or even

50. Id. at 1817.
51. Id. at 1819.
52. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1994) ("Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion lS unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for IDJury to the person m the case of consumer goods lS pnma
fac1e unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial lS not.").
53. See Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 812-13 (1958).
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JUSt bnghter-Iine rules-demanding obJective rather than subJective good faith-do not always operate m favor of dommant
mterest groups. 54 Reliable conclusions about whom the rule
favors depend on the operation of the rule (as well as on the
operation of more ostensibly flexible alternatives).
A more fundamental mcongruity plagues Scott's conclusion.
The rule that appears more flexible may mdeed better afford
transactional certamty A court confronted with an ostensibly
certam rule that the court deems mconsistent with its own conception of immanent Justice will do violence to the statutory
prescnption or ignore the statutory language altogether. 55 Consider, for example, the provision m the ongmal version of Article
3 msulatmg depositary banks·from liability for conversion when
they cashed checks beanng forged mdorsements. 56 The Code
protected the depositary m a manner that clearly made many
courts uncomfortable. Several decisions did not consider the
statutory formulation, which clearly favored banks. 57 When Article 3 was revised, depositary banks were no longer msulated
from conversion liability 58
The Article 2 expenence with unconscionability also reveals
the relationship between bnght-Iine rules and transaction certamty Section 2-302 of the Code provides that a court may void
an unconscionable contract or provision upon the court's finding,
as a matter of law, that the offensive contract or provision is

54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Montgomery v. First Nat'l Bank, 508 P.2d 428, 431-33 (Or. 1973)
(holding that a bank failed to act according to reasonable commerCial standards
rather than msulating the bank from liability for conversion as provided by U.C.C. §
3-419(3)).
56. u.c.c. § 3-419(3).
57. See, e.g, Montgomery, 508 P.2d at 431-33; Ervin v. Dauphm Deposit Trust Co.,
38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 483-84 (C.P Dauphm County 1965) (depositary bank that
paid funds over the counter to party presenting checks bearmg forged mdorsements
held to have paid out its own funds and to have remained m possess10n of proceeds
of check).
58. See U.C.C. § 3-420(c).
A representative, other than a depositary bank, who has m good faith dealt
with an mstrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the person entitled to enforce the mstrument is not liable m conversion to that
person beyond the amount of any proceeds that it has not paid out.
Id. (emphasis added).
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unconsc10nable.59 The Code does not define the term "unconscionable" and leaves the courts to their own devices to make
sense of this limitation on the freedom of contract.60 Professor
Leff criticized the unconsc1onability section as lackmg a "reality
referent." 61 In response, Professor Ellinghaus demonstrated
that this ostensible imprec1s1on was the source of the power of
the unconsc1onability section; the provision enables courts to
discern the immanent Justice of a situation and reach a result
consistent with that sense of the situation.62 Prior to the promulgation of the unconscionability rule, courts had to entertam
msubstantial common-law contract :fictions to rule m favor of the
contract ''vlctim."63
Article 2A, the uniform personal property leasmg law, contams an unconsc10nability provision modeled after the Article 2
analog. 64 The Article 2A provision goes further, however, and
is more mdulgent of the nghts of the victims of predatory contractmg. 65 That development is particularly noteworthy m regard to Scott's conclusions about the impact of dommant mterest groups because transactions within the scope of Article 2A
mvolve a dommant party-large mstitutional lessors of personal
property Article 2 does not similarly proceed from the perspective of a smgle dommant transactor group; the large mstitutional seller is also the large mstitutional buyer. So, if anything, Article 2A reasonably should have a more restnctive
rather than less restnctive unconsc10nability provision than the
one found m Article 2.
The foregomg treatment of the unconsc10nability pnnc1ple m
the law of sales and leases is not mtended to demonstrate that
commercial-law enactments are unmdulgent of particularly

59. Id. § 2-302(1).
60. See zd. §§ 1-201, 2-103 (failing to define the term).
61. Arthur A. Leff, Unconsc1onability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 558 (1967).
62. M.P Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconsc1onability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 814-15
(1969).
63. See zd. at 763.
64. u.c.c. § 2A-108.
65. Note that U.C.C. § 2A-108(2) permits a court to grant "appropnate relief' if
another party's unconscionable conduct mduces a consumer to enter mto a lease
contract. U.C.C. § 2A-108(~).
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mfluential mterest groups. Certamly, the mfluence of financial
mstitutions m payments law cannot be ignored. The pomt remams, however, that Scott's analysis does not tell very much
about the mfluence of such groups on particular commercial
legislation. As careful consideration of his "proof' reveals, his
"test" 66 for excessive mfluence and his crit1c1sm of the ALI and
the NCCUSL processes 1s fundamentally flawed.
According to Scott, the mterest group model strongly suggests
that the competitive enVIronment m which the dra:ftmg of legal
rules takes place directly affects their character. 67 He argues
that, "where several groups are m competition[,] the process will
tend to generate vague, imprecise rules and ambiguous standards."68 His favopte example of the "vague and nondirective"
rules that result from an absence of dommant mterest groups
from the dra:ftmg process 1s Article 2. 69 Within this area, Scott's
argument for ms theory of lawmakmg processes has some mitial
plausibility
Unlike the various commercial actors who engage m transactions governed by other articles of the Code, buyers and sellers
of goods share substantially the same mterests. The seller m one
Article 2 transaction 1s often the buyer m the next. The fact that
buyers and sellers are mterchangeable from one deal to the next
suggests that, at the time of Article 2's dra:ftmg, a smgle mterest
group could not have dommated the pnvate lawmakers. After
all, "Sears as buyer would not want to push too hard for fear of
preJudicmg the mterests of Sears as seller."70 So, Article 2 1s a

66. Scott, supra note 4, at 1822-50.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1825.
69. Id. ("The strikmg contrast between the rules of Article 2 and those found m
Articles 3, 4, and 9 provide [sic) a particularly salient illustration of this observation.").
70. Peter A. Alces, Roll Ouer, Llewellyn?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 543, 544 (1993).
Schwartz and Scott make this same pomt m Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 645
("The effects of sales law do not fall systematically on any mterest
group-busmesses and consumers are both buyers and sellers."). This reality and the
fact that parties can contract out of most sales-law rules lead Schwartz and Scott to
surmise that commercial mterest groups probably were not very active participants
m the or1gmal deliberations over Article 2 and to predict that they are unlikely to
take an active role m its revision. See ul. at 646. The expenence of these Authors
mdicates otherwise. See supra note 48 and accompanymg text. Schwartz and Scott
thus suggest that Article 2 is loaded with vague rules not because mterest groups
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model statute that, m terms of mterest group politics71 and
draftmg style, seems to conform to Scott's model.
The Article 2 example does not, however, support the validity
of Scott's model as much as he implies. His conclusion is vulnerable to a basic obJection: it ignores the Jurisprudential theones
of Professor Karl Llewellyn, the pnncipal drafter. 72 To appreciate this assertion, some background is needed.
During the late mneteenth century, a classical Jurisprudence
prevailed m which the law was understood to be scientific; that
is, law was believed to be a discipline complete m itself, with
"rules" that had a umversality and validity that were absolute. 73 To proceed effectively, a court needed only to discover by
deduction the correct rule and apply it to the issues posed m the
dispute at hand, without regard for the practical or political consequences of its application.74 From the begmmng of the twentieth century, the foundations of this system of legal orthodoxy
were under attack, first from the early Progressives75 and, latare m competition but because they are largely dismterested. See Schwartz & Scott,
supra note 4, at 645-47.
71. No cohesive mterest group dommated the drafting process.
72. See Mooney, supra note 32, at 223.
Although much of the actual drafting of the various articles was
done by committees, Llewellyn was the coordinator and, as such, exerclSed both tremendous mfluence and practical control over the whole
proJect. He and Professor Corbm served on the committee drafting the
sales article and m great measure Llewellyn wrote that section of the
Code to suit himself. The first version was published m 1949 and although there have been numerous and extensive revisions smce then, the
sales article and the all-important mtroductory article (Article 1) retam
most of the characterutics built mto them by Llewellyn.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
73. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960,
at 4 (1992). According to Horwitz, Professor Duncan Kennedy was the first to charactenze this belief as "Classical Legal Thought." See id. at 3 n.1. Others have appropnately called it "mechamcal Junsprudence," see Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908), and "fundamentalism," see JEROME FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND 48-56 (1930). Whatever its name, its most mfluential proponent was Harvard Law School Dean Chnstopher Columbus Langdell. WILLIAM TwINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 10 (1973). For a succmct summary of classical legal ideas, see James B. Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor,
in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 354, 368-69
(1913).
74. See FRANK, supra note 73, at 8-9.
75. Morton Horwitz marks Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), m which the
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er, dunng the 1920s and 1930s, from the "Legal Realists." 76
These diverse theonsts shared a common skepticism regarding
the existence of a structure of determmate and nondiscretionary
answers to legal quest10ns. For them, law was not a structure of
neutral and nonpolitical norms that could be disengaged from
the realities of life.
One of the most dramatic examples of the move away from
classical legal thought can be seen m the law of contracts. As
early as 1919, Professor Corbm wrote that
law does not consist of a senes of unchangeable rules or pnnc1ples
Every system of Justice and of nght is of human
development, and the necessary corollary is that no known
system is eternal. In the long history of the law can be observed the birth and death of legal pnnc1ples.
The law is
merely a part of our changmg civilization. The history of law
is the history of man and of society Legal pnnc1ples represent the prevailing mores of the time, and with the mores
they must necessarily be born, survive for the appomted season, and pensh. 77

The collapse of the classical model of contract at once freed the
legal system from an archaic emphasis on categoncal thmkmg
and foreshadowed a profound "shift m method
revealed by
the dommance of standards over rules m the processes of conSupreme Court used freedom of contract as a constitutional doctnne to strike down
a maximum hours law for bakers, as the watershed event that established progressive legal thinking and marked the beginning of the end of classical thought,
HORWITZ, supra note 73, at 33-39. For a Progressive critique of Lochner, see Roscoe
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909). The most striking tenet of the
Progressive movement was a belief that the legal system was inseparable from existing political and social conditions. See generally id. (describing social realities that
undermined Judicial reasoning in the freedom of contract cases of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries).
76. The term "legal realism" has its genesis in an article by Llewellyn. See Karl
N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431
(1930). Although realism "was neither a coherent intellectual movement nor a conslStent or systematic Junsprudence," HORWITZ, supra note 73, at 169, Morton Horwitz
explains that "above all, Realism is a continuation of the Progressive attack on the
attempt of late-nineteenth-century Classical Legal Thought to create a sharp distinction between law and politics and to portray law as neutral, natural, and apolitical,"
id. at 170.
77. Arthur L. Corbin, Preface to Third American Edition of WILLIAM R. ANSON,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 1919).
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tract formation and mterpretation."78 Into tlns settmg caine
Karl Llewellyn.
Llewellyn was one of the most mfluential figures m the realist
assault on the conceptualism of the old order. 79 He believed m
finding the law m the commercial context that gave nse to the
dispute. Accordingly, the Judicial task was to discover tlns socalled "immanent law " Llewellyn accepted the view that
[e]very fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order
can take it m, carnes withm itself its appropnate, natural
rules, its nght law This is a natural law which is real, not
rmagmary; it is not a creature of mere reason, but rests on
the solid foundation of what reason can recogmze m the nature of man and of the life conditions of the time and place; it
is thus not eternal nor changeless nor everywhere the same,
but is mdwelling m the very circumstances of life. The highest task of law-givmg consists m uncovenng and rmplementmg this immanent law 80

That Llewellyn assigned for lnmself the responsibility of draftmg Article 2 is not surpnsmg. After all, the sales construct is a
peculiarly appropriate model for the draftmg style that
Llewellyn had m mmd. Unlike the. other articles of the Code,
Article 2 contemplates an essentially bipartite transaction between a seller and a buyer. Third parties may play a role, but
their participation is essentially mmor. 81 In the sales context,
the values of certamty and predictability are able to take a

78. Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 786 (1982) (footnote omitted).
79. See generally T\VINING, supra note 73 (providing an mterpretation of
Llewellyn's thought and its development).
80. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 122 (1960) (quoting Levm
Goldschmidt). According to Richard Danzig:
Llewellyn saw law as an articulation and regularization of unconsciously
evolved mores-as a crystallization of a generally recogmzed and almost
mdisputably nght rule (a "smgmg reason"), mherent m, but very possibly
obscured by, existing patterns of relationships. To him an "immanent
law" lay embedded m any situation and the task of the law authority
was to discover it.
Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code,
27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 624 (1975).
81. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-104, -506 (1994) (financmg agency); id. §§ 2-504, -509(1),
-705 (earner); id. §§ 2-503(4), -509(2) (bailee).
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backseat to the need to divme and fulfill the parties' expectations created by their factual bargam. 82 To accomplish this,
Llewellyn drafted a statute that reqmres a court to familiarize
itself with relevant commercial practices. It does this
by utilizmg flexible standards, such as commercial reasonableness and good faith, rather than rules that purport to
capture and solidify prevailing practices and norms. Each
dispute between a seller and buyer is placed m its functional
setting where the parties are expected to find and prove relevant "habits," i.e., trade usage or practices, as part of the
agreement. Under these standards, the court is given flexibility (at some cost to certamty and admrmstrability) to resolve
the new or umque dispute. Moreover, standards are thought
to reduce the gap between law and practice and to msure
that dec1s1ons are practical and responsive to the needs, proven m the particular case, of the parties and the relevant
busmess community 83
82. The foundation for much of Article 2 is therefore made to rest on the concept
of "agreement." The definition provides: "'Agreement' means the bargam of the parties m fact as found m their language or by implication from other circumstances
mcluding course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance
" Id. §
1-201(3). Comment 1 to § 1-205 further remforces the notion that expectations develop m the context of commercial practices.
This Act reJects both the "lay-dictionary" and the "conveyancer's" reading
of a commercial agreement. Instead the meanmg of the agreement of the
parties is to be determmed by the language used by them and by their
action, read and mterpreted m the light of commercial practices and
other surrounding circumstances. The measure and background for mterpretation are set by the commercial context, which may explam and
supplement even the language of a formal or final writing.
Id. § 1-205 cmt. 1.
This emphasis on real commercial life may, at times, undermme Article 2's
certamty. Some find no fault m this conclusion. One of the Authors, for example,
has argued that the open-ended drafting style of Article 2 helps guide courts toward
the best results. See Alces, supra note 70, at 546; see also John E. Murray, Jr., The
Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1447, 1450-52
(1994) (discussmg Article 2's flexible standards). Others, however, grimly contemplate
the prospect of cases with unpredictable outcomes. See, e.g., Danzig, supra note 80,
at 630 ("[T]he Llewellyn approach seems paradoxically to undermme that very certamty and consistency m the law that the Uniform Commercial Code was dedicated
to obtrumng."); Grant Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814
(1962) ("The tastes of the practicmg lawyers who advised the draftsmen were, m
most cases, opposed to the flexible ideas of the Chief Reporter: they preferred, they
msisted on, a tightly-drawn statute, precise, detailed and rigid.").
83. PEB STUDY GROUP, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
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Seen m th.Is light, Article 2 1s a 'junsprudential statement."84
It reflects not merely a particular view about the appropnate
source of sales law but also, and perhaps more mterestingly, a
distinctive theory about how cases ought to be decided.
Llewellyn recogmzed that deciding difficult cases mvolves considerations of vanous kinds. Because courts make their dec1s1ons after the dispute has ansen and because the common law
focuses on mdividual cases, the common-law process has a significant advantage over legislation m responding to changing
conditions and mores. The sales article reflects a salutary understanding that Judges rather than legislators should make
some Judgments of policy and pnnc1ple. In sum, Article 2 1s best
understood and defended as a means of facilitating common-law
decis10nmaking. A quite general conclusion emerges from th.Is
discuss10n: the style of Article 2 1s the way it 1s because a "selfconsc1ous Junsprude" drafted it. 85 In short, good reason exists
for doubting that the real cause of its 1mprec1s10n 1s the ability
and willingness of mterest groups to compete m the political
marketplace.

CODE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2 PRELIMINARY REPORT 9 (1990) (footnotes omitted). The drafting approach of Article 9 is quite different. Donald Rapson
describes the difference this way: "Compared to Article 2 which looks to the courts
and other forums to decide disputes by applymg Article 2 pnnc1ples, Article 9 endeavors to prevent the disputes by antiCipating the ISsues and furmshmg answers."
Alces, supra note 70, at 545 (quoting Letter from Donald J. Rapson, Member, Permanent Editonal Bd. of the UCC, to Peter A. Alces, Associate Professor of Law,
Umversity of Alabama 1-2 (Mar. 31, 1986)). The odd thmg IS that Scott hmISelf
suggests at least one functional distinction between Articles 2 and 9 that may explam the different drafting styles. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1799-1800 ("Article 9's
filing system seeks to regulate the provision of mformation, leavmg the regulation of
mISbehavior to pnvate ordenng among the parties."). Notice, however, that, when
Article 9 attempts to regulate behavior, as it does m Part 5, it does so m a style
sunilar to the approach taken m Article 2. See, e.g., Donald J. Rapson, Repurchase
(of Collateral?) Agreements and the Larger Issue of Deficumcy Actions: What Does
Section 9-504(5) Mean?, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 649, 680-92 (1992-1993) (critic1zmg the
application of the "commercial reasonableness" standard when applied m the context
of deficiency actions).
84. Alces, supra note 70, at 543.
85. Danzig, supra note 80, at 621.
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B. Commercial Legislation by Public Legislature: The
Bankruptcy Code Experience
No one has the data necessary to draw mtellectually defensible conclusions about patterns of special mterest group mfluence
on both the pnvate and public lawmakmg processes. The unpress10n that a PL is especially vulnerable to mterest group
capture is almost certamly mcorrect. Instances m which a PL
might have succumbed to the will of a special mterest group
whose mterests may not comcide with the public mterest may
provide a basis for criticism of the PL as a lawmakmg mstitut10n. The issue, however, really must be: with what should the
decisions of a PL be compared? Public legislatures are also far
from perfect. The legislative output of public legislatures shows
signs of mterest group mfluence no better, and perhaps far
worse, than the mdications of such pressure seen m the product
of PLs. 86 Indeed, m light of the more complete and systematic
evidence regarding the commercial legislation produced by public legislatures, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that, at least
m the area of commercial law, the ALI and the NCCUSL are
two of our society's most reliable lawmakmg mstitutions.
Several bodies of federal law clearly reflect the political demands of special mterests. Perhaps the most promment example
is bankruptcy law, which is so nddled with legal rules designed
to benefit the narrow preferences of discrete mterest groups
rather than those of the public-at-large that it has compromised
the potential rehabilitation of many financially distressed compames. 87 The followmg examples provide JUSt a small sampling
of special mterest legislation netted from the Bankruptcy Code
as it stood pnor to the 1994 amendments. 88
When the Supreme Court held that firms could reJect unfavor-

86. See, e.g., mfra not.es 87-107 and accompanymg text.
87. Tlus theme has been articulated m much of the academic commentary on the
Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Damel Keating, Bankruptcy Code§ 1114: Congress' Empty Response to the Retiree Plight, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. i7, 19 (1993) ("[T]here is a
growmg sentiment among promment members of the bankruptcy community that the
proliferation of special mterest legislation m the Bankruptcy Code t.ends to thwart
one of its primary functions: the financial rehabilitation of struggling compames.").
88. For discussion of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, see infra not.es 99-107
and accompanymg text.
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able collective bargaimng agreements because they were executory contracts,89 Congress came under immediate fire from orgamzed labor seekmg protective legislation.90 As a result of this
mtense lobbymg effort, § 1113 was added to the Bankruptcy
Code. 91 Tlns section permits a firm to escape its collective bargainmg agreement only after it has engaged m elaborate negotiations. 92 Admittedly, there 1s room for disagreement about
whether this legislation comc1des with the public mterest. The
tension between the mfluence of a special mterest group and the
congressional response 1s, however, undemable.
Another manifestation of the significant mfluence of a discrete
mterest group 1s § 1114, which favors retiree claims to medical
benefits by treating the firm's obligations as admimstrative
expenses. 93 The result 1s that the debtor will pay these claims
89. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). The Court was
unammous in its holding that the term "executory contract" in § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code includes collective bargammg agreements. Id. at 517-27. In a narrow
five-to-four declSlon, the Court also held that a debtor does not commit an unfair
labor practice when it unilaterally reJects or modifies a collective bargaining agreement without pnor approval of the bankruptcy court. Id. at 532-34.
90. See William Sernn, Labor Leaders Voice Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1984,
at D25; see also Charlene R. Ehrenwerth & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The New Bank-

ruptcy Procedures for Re1ection of Collective-Bargammg Agreements: Is the Pendulum
Swmgmg Back, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 939, 950 (1985) (describing Congress's swift reaction
in the wake of Bildisco); Richard H. Gibson, The New Law on Re1ection of Collective
Bargammg Agreements m Chapter 11: An Analysis of 11 U.S.C. § 1113, 58 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 325, 326 (1984) (describing congressional deadlock over corrective legislation); Rosalind Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargammg Agreement-A
Brief Lesson m the Use of the Constitutional System of Checks and Balances, 58 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 293, 312-21 (1984) (same); James J. White, The Bildisco Case and the
Congressional Response, 30 WAYNE L. REV: 1169, 1190-98 (1984) (same).
91. 11 u.s.c. § 1113 (1994).
92. Essentially, § 1113 provides that a bankruptcy court may approve the reJection
of a collective bargaining agreement only after: (1) the debtor makes a proposal that
provides for modifications to the agreement "necessary" to permit an effective reorgamzation, (2) the umon reJects the proposal without good cause, and (3) the balance
of equities clearly favors reJection of the agreement. Id. § 1113(c)(l)-(3). Tins section
reflects "insIStent congressional effort to replace the Bildisco standard with one that
[is] more sensitive to the national policy favonng collective bargammg agreements."
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1089 (3d
Cir. 1986).
93. The Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334,
§ 2(a), 102 Stat. 610 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1114), added § 1114 to the Bankruptcy
Code. Daniel Keating wrote about the rmpetus behmd the law.
Anybody even vaguely familiar with tins law knows that it was enacted
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ahead of the claims of current employees and unsecured
creditors. 94 Not surpnsmgly, many commentators with little
sympathy for legislators subJect to mterest group pressure have
adopted the view that this retiree legislation, dnven by one
particular mterest group, and the rehabilitative goal of Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code are mcompatible. Leslie T. Gladstone
put it this way·
Special mterest legislation is becommg mcreasmgly prevalent under the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 11 was designed to
balance the various competmg mterests. That delicate balance is upset by special mterest legislation. Certamly retirees
are deservmg of protection. Equally deservmg, however, are
tort claimants or, mdeed, low-mcome creditors as a whole. If
Congress were to accommodate all deservmg mterests, chapter ll's utility would effectively be destroyed. Congress's
selective accommodation senously undermmes the policy
favonng equal distribution among creditors. An overall benefit can be achieved only if the various claimants share equally and refram from fightmg for preferential treatment. 95

These observat10ns about§ 1114 do not necessarily mean that
every provis10n motivated by special mterest politics is wrong.
The Bankruptcy Code's text and legislative history, however,
prove that the section was a tnumph for one politically active
group. These cons1derat1ons weigh agamst facile acceptance of
the belief that PLs are peculiarly susceptible to mfluence by a
dommant mterest group.
Iromcally, at least m the realm of bankruptcy law, the phem direct response to LTV Corporation's cutoff of retiree medical benefits
when it entered chapter 11 bankruptcy m the summer of 1986. In effect,
the new legislation told LTV and any other company with sunilar mtentions that they must, absent extenuating circumstances, continue to honor
promises of medical benefits made to retirees even if the company was m
chapter 11.
Keating, supra note 87, at 17-18. Although the modification of retiree benefits is
possible under a process strikmgly sunilar to the steps reqUJied under § 1113 for
reJection of collective bargammg agreements, see supra note 92, there lS some evidence that Congress mtended greater protection for retiree benefits, see Leslie T.
Gladstone, Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988: Welfare Benefits m
Need of Reform, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 427, 447 (1991).
94. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503, 507, 726.
95. Gladstone, supra note 93, at 450-51 (footnotes omitted).
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nomenon of capture extends beyond the efforts of lobbyists for
pnvate special mterests. When the issue was the constitutional
status of bankruptcy Judges and the bankruptcy courts, even the
Chief Justice of the United States and the Judicial Conference of
the United States became active lobbyists.96 No one has yet
come forward with evidence of this type of Judicial mtrus1on mto
the pnvate legislative process. 97
The pomt goes deeper still. Scott surmises that secured financmg ms1ders enJOY an orgamzational advantage m dealing

96. In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Lme Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982), the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy Judges, as Article I Judges, were
without Judicial power under the Constitution to hear a Marathon-type case mvolvmg purely state-law 1Ssues when no basis of JurISdiction other than the Bankruptcy
Code existed, id. at 76. These cases could only be heard by an Article III Judge with
life tenure. Id. The practical effect of th!S dec1s10n was to undermme the entire
JurISdictional scheme of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Congress could have provided
the necessary constitutional fix simply by makmg the bankruptcy Judges Article III
Judges. Th1S idea proved to be politically unfeasible. See New Court Deciswns-Bankruptcy, 53 U.S.L.W. 2297, 2298 (Dec. 18, 1984). Instead, Congress responded with the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
which gave the reqwsite bankruptcy Jurisdiction to Article III Judges m the distnct
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994). Congress then provided that distnct courts can
delegate JurISdiction to the bankruptcy courts m "cases under" the Bankruptcy Code
and m "proceedings ansmg under
or ansmg m or related to" the Code. Id. §
157(a). Still, constitutional 1Ssues remam. See generally Vern Countryman, The Bankruptcy Judges: Jurisdiction by Neglect, 92 COM. L.J. 1 (1987) (critiqumg the uncertam bases for bankruptcy court Jurisdiction); Lloyd King, A Chart of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction for Admiralty Lawyers, 59 TUL. L. REv. 1264 (1985) (describmg procedures
by which admiralty lawyers may avoid bankruptcy court Jurisdiction). Professor
Countryman explams why:
Many of the 1984 defects are doubtlessly due to the fact that too
many special mterest cooks were stirnng the broth, each concerned with
adding its own mgredient but without much knowledge of or mterest m
the impact on the overall end product. Nothmg more is to be expected of
lobbyists for the consumer credit mdustry or other pnvate mterests. But
it IS most disturbmg that the special mterest lobbyists m th!S case mcluded the Chief Justice of the United States and the Judicial Conference
of the United States. It is also most disturbmg that the one mgredient
essential to them m any solution was that bankruptcy Judges not be
given Article III status.
Vern Countryman, Scrambling To Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice,
the Judicial Conference, and the Legislatiue Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 43-44
(1985).
97. For a recent discussion of the propnety of a Judge's participation m ALI deliberations and proJects, see Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories:
Wisconsin and the American Law Institute, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1, 25-30.
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with pnvate legislators that is lackmg m their dealings with
public lawmakers. 98 Yet the recently enacted Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 paradoxically suggests a different understandmg of the relative ease with which this group can capture a
public legislature. On its face, this legislation is far more hospitable to the mterests of secured creditors than to the needs of
unsecured creditors. 99 Many of its proVIs10ns do not merely proVIde a clear statement from Congress and thus seek to promote
pnnc1ples of consistent and certam adjudication; they represent
a quite general effort to resolve issues ma way that systematically benefits secured parties. 100
Examples mclude overruling the Deprizio line of cases, 101
protecting security mterests m postpetition rents, 102 expanding

98. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1818 ("This suggests, mter alia, that an lllStitution that functions as the ALI and NCCUSL do is sometimes easier to mfluence
than ordinary legislatures; as a consequence, it will enact more special mterest
legislation.").
99. This notion apparently contradicts Scott's statement that "there is at least
1mpress1omstic evidence that unsecured creditors, managers, and debtors had some
role m molding the Bankruptcy Code to suit their needs, which were dnven m large
part by the sympathetic stance toward secured creditors evident m Article 9." Id. at
1849 n.215.
100. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanymg text.
101. See Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490
(6th Cir. 1990); Manufacturers Hanover Leasmg Corp. v. Lowrey (In re Robmson
Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989); Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin.
Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989) (generally referred to m the bankruptcy field as
In re V.N. Depnz10 Constr. Co.). In these cases, courts reasoned that, m situations
mvolvmg an "insider" guarantee, the trustee has authority to recapture preferential
payments made to undersecured and unsecured creditors a full year pnor to the
bankruptcy filing. See Ray, 899 F.2d at 1494; Manufacturers Hanauer, 892 F.2d at
850; Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1193-94. The new law changes the Deprizio result by addmg a new subsection (c) to 11 U.S.C. § 550. This provlSlon makes it clear that
transfers made between 90 days and one year before the filing of the petition cannot
be recovered from non-ms1der transferees. 11 U.S.C. § 550(c) (1994).
102. In Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1979), the Court held that
lenders have a security mterest m postpetition rents only to the extent that they
have perfected their security mterest under applicable state law. Because, m many
states, this requirement mvolves the appomtment of a receiver, creditors who failed
to take this step have often had secured claims demed. See, e.g., In re Multi-Group
III Ltd. Partnership, 99 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); In re Metro Square, 93 B.R.
990 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988), order reu'd, 106 B.R. 584 (D. Minn. 1989); In re TM
Carlton House Partners, Ltd., 91 B.R. 349 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 928 F.2d
1131 (3d Cir. 1991). The Bankruptcy Code now provides for an enforceable security
mterest m rents if the secured party has perfected the lien on the underlymg prop-
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the protection given to purchase money security mterests, 103
broademng the exceptions to the automatic stay,104 and enhancmg the rights of secured creditors m consumer bankruptcies. 105 Any suggestion that the decidedly pro-secured creditor
stance taken by the new act 1s unrelated to mterest group politics would be odd. Indeed, many of the new provisions appear to
be a self-conscious effort to reflect a particular mterest group's
own view of how the Bankruptcy Code ought to work. 106
If the above assertions are true, the establishment of a National Bankruptcy Review Commission to review the Code rmght
be defended as a frank recognition that, at times, a study group
sunilar to the NCCUSL model 1s umquely well situated to make
relevant policy decisions. 107 Tlns assessment 1s not a mecham-

erty and the security agreement extends to rents. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b). Moreover,
sub3ect to an "equities of the case" exception, this subsection also protects a secured
party's mterest m revenue streams generated by hotels and other lodgmg properties.

Id.
103. Congress amended § 547(c)(3) to provide that a trustee may not avoid as a
preference the perfection of a purchase money security mterest if it occurs withm 20
days of the debtor's receivmg possession of the collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3). Congress mtended the extension of the grace penod from 10 to 20 days to conform the
Bankruptcy Code with the prevailing version of UCC § 9-301(2). Id. § 547 (histoncal
and reVISion notes).
104. One important new exception mvolves "smgle asset real estate," as defined m
§ 101(51B). A secured creditor may have the stay lifted after 90 days unless the
debtor has filed a reasonable reorgamzation plan or has commenced monthly mterest
payments to the creditor. Id. § 362(d)(3). Another noteworthy change is to § 1110.
Formerly, this section permitted a creditor to ignore the automatic stay if it claimed
a purchase money security mterest m certam types of aircraft and vessels. See 11
U.S.C. § 1110 (1992). Congress has now broadened the scope of § 1110 to mclude all
security mterests, not JUSt mterests obtamed to enable the debtor to acqwre the
eqwpment. 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (1994).
105. Congress amended § 522(0 to prohibit debtor avoidance of nonpossessory,
nonpurchase money security mterests m tools, animals, and crops to the extent that
the value of such property lS m excess of $5,000. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(3) (1994). This
new provlSion, however, applies only when the debtor has chosen or is reqwred to
utilize the state exemptions and the state prohibits the avoidance of consensual liens
on exempt property or state law permits exemptions without limitation m amount.
See id.
106. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanymg text.
107. Title VI of the new act provides for the creation of a nme-member commission
to study the Bankruptcy Code and make formal recommendations on needed reforms.
See National Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4147
(codified as amended m scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). The President, Congress, and the Chief Justice of the United States appomt members of the
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cal exercise to uncover general legislative supenority It calls for
a Judgment about comparative competence, undertaken m light
of the statutory structure and the applicable considerations of
both fact and policy Special mterest group politics poses no
more s1gruficant challenge to the PL process than it does to
lawmakmg as a whole.
IV

THE FILING SYSTEM

Scott reviewed the Article 9 revision committee's treatment of
the filing system to prove his pomts about the failures of the
uruform commercial law dra:ftmg process. 108 In Scott's estimation, the dominance of large mstitutional lenders tilts the filing
system playmg field m favor of those lenders' mterests. 109 Scott
errs both m his understanding of the filing system rules, mcludmg their operation and political context, and m his conclusions
concermng what the filing system reveals about the politics of
Article 9 and the uniform commercial law movement.

A. Scott on Filing System Politics
The filing system of Article 9 is the foundation of the uniform
personal property security law 110 Article 9 is a "race" statute
because the first to file or otherwise perfect a collateral mterest
m the debtor's property will have pnority over virtually all comCommission. Id. § 604(a). Members of Congress and the executive branch are meligible for appomtment. Id. The pnncipal benefits of the Commission seem to be a reduction m the mfluence of special mterest groups and a corresponding mcrease m
the mfluence of "experts" with a greater understanding of the reorgamzation process
and of the general thrust of bankruptcy law. See J. Vincent Aug, Jr., "A View from
the Bench" or the Other "R" Word, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 397, 403 (1992).
I think of what a powerful and prestigious review commission could accomplish. First of all, it could be an end to tinkenng with the Code by
special mterest groups. These special mterest groups' understanding of
the Bankruptcy Code almost never gets beneath the surface of
nondischargeability of a certam type of debt or mclusion or exclusion of
types of assets from a bankruptcy estate. If you showed these folks a
Judicial impact statement, they wouldn't understand what you were talkmg about. They are very superficial m their approach.
Id.
108. Scott, supra note 4, at 1788-90.
109. Id. at 1785-87.
110. See U.C.C. § 9-401 (1994) (setting forth provisions for required filings).
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petmg creditors. m The debtor and all creditors of the debtor
thus depend on the mtegrity of the filing system. So long as the
system works, the cost of credit should be less than if a coherent
filing or public notice system were not m place.
The current Article 9 filing system has been the subJect of
substantial debate, both m acadermc and practitioner circles. 112
The committee drafting the revision of Article 9 has drawn upon
comprehensive studies of the current filing system to fashion
adjustments to the status quo. 113 They have designed these adJUstments to improve the mtegrity of the system and thereby
lower the cost of credit by reducmg some of the nsk imposed on
the Article 9 scheme by deficiencies m the filing system. 114 In
addition, the dra:ftmg committee has rethought the place of
perfection by filing m the array of available and sometimes
competing forms of perfection. 115
Amendments to filing practices are problematic to effect for a
number of reasons. First, a comprehensive commercial statute
such as Article 9 cannot easily rmcromanage the mterstices of
the filing system, a regime largely within the province of clerical
and adrmmstrative staff at the state and local levels throughout
the country 116 Second, the benefits of improving the system

111. Id. § 9-301 (establishmg pnorities for certam creditors based on filing status).
112. A recent symposmm issue of the Minnesota Law Review was devoted to the
Article 9 filing system. Symposmm, "Managing the Paper Trail"· Evaluating and
Reforming the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1995).
113. PEB STUDY GROUP, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT 88 (1992) [heremafter FINAL
REPORT); Peter A. Alces & Robert M. Lloyd, An Agenda for Reform of the Article 9
Filing System, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 99, 101-05, 115-24 (1991); see PEB STUDY GROUP,
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 APPENDICES TO REPORT 15-136 (1992) (providing the results of
the Article 9 Filing System Task Force's study of the current filing system).
114. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 88.
115. For a review of alternative perfection systems, see generally Lynn M. LoPucki,
Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on Building the Electronic
Highway, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1992, at 5 (discussmg the possibility
and promISe of a computenzed filing system); David M. Phillips, Flawed Perfection:
From Possession to Filing Under Article 9 (pts. 1 & 2), 59 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1979)
(analyzmg the considerations that have contributed to the declinmg importance of
possession), 59 B.U. L. REV. 209 (1979) (exanumng the impact of possession on the
Article 9 filing system).
116. See U.C.C. § 9-401 (1994) (setting forth detailed filing reqmrements, mcluding
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are not compelling because the parties that would realize the
greatest gams from improvement of the system have not mdicated that they have any means of effectmg the improvements. 117
Tinrd, no consensus exists as to what would constitute real
improvement of the system because no consensus has ansen as
to what the system should do. 118 Fourth, the filing system 1s
captive to the technology spiral; the available means to modernize (i.e., computenze) the system multiply apace, but not all
filing venues can afford to avail themselves of the evolvmg technologies.119 Paradoxically, the pace of advance combmed with
the mcons1stent level of funding for new technologies withm and
among the states means that the prospects for true uniformity of
filing practices may be more bleak than at any time m the history of the Umform Commercial Code.
Any determmation of the adjustments m the filing system
that would best serve the mterests of a particular constituency
necessitates a commg to terms with the way m which the system, as currently constituted, fixes the pnority of some creditors
over others. The general rule of Article 9 1s "first to file or perfect wms." 120 The race charactenstic of the system favors the
vigilant and pumshes mdividuals who do not appreciate the
system's operation and who fail to appnse themselves of the
mformation that the system provides or to provide the mformation that the system requires.
Agamst that "first-m-time-wms" backdrop, current Article 9
provides certam exceptions and traps for the less wary For
example, a financmg statement improperly filed will still operate
agamst an mdividual with actual knowledge of it, 121 thus dilutmg the pure race nature of the system. In addition and more

proper localities m wluch to file).
117. See Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 679,
707 (1995) (argumg that the only purpose of the filing system is to assure secured
creditors of the pnority mterests given under Article 9).
118. Id. at 692-704.
119. See LoPucki, supra note 115, at 15 (discussmg technological improvements m
the filing system).
120. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301, -312 (listing creditors who take pnority over unperfected
security mterests and establishmg rules for pnoritizmg among conflicting security
mterests).
121. Id. § 9-401(2).
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consequentially, Article 9 provides special rules to favor purchase money financmg, assurmg, so the argument goes, that one
lender will not enJOY monopoly power over the debtor. 122 Further, m some circumstances, the article deems certam creditors
automatically perfected, without any necessity of a filing. 123
That means that automatic perfection may, on the nght facts,
prevail over a security mterest perfected by filing. 124 In other
mstances, "secret liens" operate m favor of mdividuals who have
not been the first to file or perfect m the proper venue. 125
Large mstitutional creditors, the group that Scott argues is m
the best position to mfluence the revis10n of Article 9,126 engage m many forms of secured and unsecured lending. Some of
the secured lending is "purchase money," and other port10ns of a
particular bank's portfolio may mvolve unsecured loans, workmg
capital loans secured by all or only a portion of the tangible and
mtangible assets of a debtor. As a result, the form of both the
lending and the collateral will determme, from one case to the
next, which Article 9 rules will operate. To the extent that a rule
reduces the lender's nsk m some loans but does so at the expense of competing creditor mterests, that same rule may mcrease the lender's nsk m the next deal and thereby the cost of
that loan.
Professor Gillette recogmzed this key to the failure of Scott's
test of mterest group impact on the Article 9 revis10n process: "I
have some quibble with the mherent assumption that the world
can easily be divided mto camps of secured and unsecured creditors or occasional creditors and financial msiders such that
members of each camp share the same mterests."127 The footnote accompanymg that text is telling:

i22. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167-75 (1979) (discussing situational
monopoly and the purchase money pnority).
123. u.c.c. §§ 9-302(2)-(4), -304 to -305.
124. Id. § 9-312.
125. See LoPuclo, supra note 115, at 7-9 (discussing filings that remain effective
even though they cannot be discovered in a search).
126. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1786-87.
127. Clayton P Gillette, Politics and Revision: A Comment on Scott, 80 VA. L. REV.
1853, 1857 (1994).
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The mterests of those who take purchase money security
mterests or who are more likely to be purchasers of chattel
paper will vary from the mterests of general financers who
take wraparound security mterests. Thus, any complete mterest group theory will have to account for the way conflicts
among these groups are treated m the reVIs1on process. 128

Insofar as Scott's prennse that large mstitut10nal creditors occupy one transactional position and benefit from rules that favor
that position at the expense of those occupymg other positions129 relies on his mcomplete appreciation of large mstitutional creditors' loan portfolios, the conclusions proceeding from
that prennse are necessarily flawed. Consideration of Scott's
particular conclusions about the operation of the filing system
revisions with respect to purchase money security mterests and
proceeds of collateral reveals the fatal flaw
In the section of his article captioned "Filing, PMSis, and
Proceeds,"130 Scott describes the Article 9 Study Group Report
on the state of the filing system and then compares the proposals for reform with his conception of the mterests of large mstitutional secured creditors. 131 Scott correctly explams that the
Article 9 Study Group Report on the filing system described
numerous deficiencies of the extant system. 132 He also writes
that, m response, "the Filing Report recommended a senes of
revisions, rangmg from wholesale technological reform, to keepmg the current system while reqmnng more centralized filing
practices, such as filing by taxpayer identification number, clanfymg the debtor's name reqmrement, and imposmg time limits
on filing processmg."133
i28. Id. at 1857 n.9.
129. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1785-87.
130. Id. at 1829.
131. Id. at 1829-38.
132. Id. at 1829-30.
133. Id. In the footnote accompanymg that text, Scott somewhat cryptically and cunously observes that "neither the mmutes nor the correspondence of the Study
Group mdicate that its members ever questioned the assumption that the concerns
enumerated m the Filing Report cause real hardship for secured creditors." Id. at
1830 n.140. Is Scott suggesting that deficiencies m the status quo do not compromise the efficiency and reliability of the system? Would not any deficiency that undermmes the certamty of the system necessarily mcrease nsk and therefore mcrease
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Scott opmes that the Study Group could have recommended
one of "two polar alternatives" 134-a remforcement of the role
of the filing system at the expense of the pnmary secured creditors who, Scott concludes, would subsidize the expensive improvements or, alternatively, the elimmation of public filing
altogether. 135 Scott then explams that the Study Group Report
advocated a middle ground-a compromise-Scott asserts, that
1s best explamed by his mterest group analysis. 136 The compromise expands "the existing categones of exemptions from
some or all of the filing rules so long as the benefits of the
larger exemptions accrue to members of the [dominant mterest
group, large mstitutional secured creditors]."137 Scott never
makes clear why these powerful mterest groups did not simply
use all of their resources to abrogate the filing system altogether.138 Such a result occurred m the promulgation of Article 2A,
when the ostensible ownership issues were before the draftmg
committee, and the final product mcluded no filing reqmrement
whatsoever. 139

B. Choice of Law
Scott offers the Study Group recommendations concermng
ch01ce of law as a "clear example"140 of the type of relatively
precise rule mdicative of mterest group capture. 141 Currently,
the correct office for filing purposes, though of critical importance to the secured party, 142 can be difficult to deternnne. 143
the cost of all secured transactions m which filing matters? The pomt is not that
deficiencies of the filing system cause hardship for secured creditors but rather that
they burden the secured credit system and thereby cause hardship for all creditors.
Debtors are also affected because they will pay more for credit than they would if
the security system was more reliable.
134. Id. at 1830.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1830-31.
137. Id. at 1832.
138. See id. at 1831 n.144 (discussmg the mcentive structure m public and pnvate
disclosure systems).
139. See U.C.C. § 2A-101 cmt. (1994).
140. Scott, supra note 4, at 1826.
141. Id.
142. If the secured party files m the wrong place or not m all of the places reqwred by the UCC, the security mterest will remam unperfected. In re Walker, 142
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The first thmg to decide is the state m which the secured party
must file a financmg statement. 144 The answer to this-question
is found m the conflict-of-laws rules of section 9-103. 145 This
section consists of six subsections, each of which contams the
conflict-of-laws provision for a particular type of collateral. 146
The primary rule for tangible collateral with a relatively permanent situs is that the law of the Jurisdiction m which the collat-eral is located governs perfection and the effect of perfection. 147
On its face, such a rule seems srmple enough. The secured
party must only determme where the collateral is located and
then comply with that Jurisdiction's perfection reqmrements. 148
Such a rule, though simple, is not satisfactory; the various types

B.R. 484, 485 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (construmg the filing reqwrement stnctly).
The general rule 15 that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by thlS Act a security agreement 15 effective according to its terms between the parties, agamst purchasers of
the collateral and agamst creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201. Despite the general rule, an unperfected security mterest is unenforceable against most third parties because the
number of exceptions to the general rule have, m fact, gobbled up the rule. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 9-301 (listing persons who take pnority over an unperfected security mterest); see also 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(l) (1994) (declanng that the bankruptcy trustee
prevails over secured creditors whose interests are unperfected on the date of
bankruptcy).
143. The number of cases mvolvmg an allegedly misfiled imancmg statement reported m a UCC reporting service exceeds 200. 26 ·u.c.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) §§
9401.26-.27 (1989 & Supp. 1995).
144. After the secured party resolves the "whlch state" question, she must determme the proper office or offices withm the state with whlch to file the financmg
statement. UCC § 9-401(1) offers each adopting state the choice of three alternative
prov1s1ons that fix the place to file. U.C.C. § 9-401(1). Depending on whlch prov1s1on
a state adopts, the answer to the "where m the state" question could depend on the
debtor's place of residence or busmess, the location of the collateral, or the use of
the collateral. Id. Because Scott ignores the Study Group's position on thls second
question, th15 Article will do the same.
145. Id. § 9-103.
146. The six categories of collateral are: (1) documents, mstruments, and ordinary
goods; (2) goods covered by a certificate of title; (3) accounts, general mtangibles,
and mobile goods; (4) chattel paper; (5) minerals; and (6) mvestment property. Id.
147. Id. Section 9-103(1)(b) provides that:
Except as otherwise provided m thls subsection, perfection and the effect
of perfection or non-perfection of a security interest m collateral are governed by the law of the JUnsdiction where the collateral is when the last
event occurs on whlch is based the assertion that the security mterest is
perfected or unperfected.
Id.
148. Id.
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of collateral covered by section 9-103(1) have a relatively fixed
location but are nevertheless capable of movement. 149 Therefore, section 9-103(1) combmes a temporal test with a location
test. The statute also tells the secured party to determine the
location of the collateral when "the last event occurs on which is
based the assertion that the security mterest is perfected or
unperfected." 150 This provis10n is the so-called ''last event"
test. 151
The Study Group Report recommended applymg the law of
the Jurisdiction where the debtor is located. 152 It did so for several reasons. First, the Study Group focused on the benefits of
having a smgle choice-of-law rule. 153 For example, a smgle rule
will obviate the need for a secured party to make multiple filings
m many cases m which such filings are now necessary 154 One
problem with current section 9-103 anses when the debtor does
busmess m more than one Jurisdiction. A secured party who
wishes to perfect a security mterest m the debtor's mventory
and accounts must now file both where the mventory is located155 and where the debtor is located. 156 This double filing
would not be necessary m a one-rule regime. 157

149. See id. § 9-103(1) (covenng "[d]ocuments, mstruments, and ordinary goods").
150. Id. § 9-103(1)(b).
151. The potential ambiguity of the last event test can make its application extraordinarily difficult. For example, must the last event be one of the statutory
events required for perfection? The review group that analyzed the ISsue said "no,"
charactenzmg the requirement as an "all events" test. FINAL REPORT, supra note
113, at 78. For an overview of the last event test, see David Frisch, U.C.C. Filings:

Changing Circumstances Can Make a Right Filing Wrong. But Can They Make a
Wrong Filing Right?, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1263-71 (1983). The Study Group
waffles on whether any form of the last event test deserves mclus1on m the new
Article 9. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 78-79.
152. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 74. The report recommends that the "location of the collateral" be retained for those mstances m which the secured party
perfects by possession. Id.
153. Id. at 75.
154. Id.
155. u.c.c. § 9-103(1) (1994).
156. To perfect a security mterest m accounts, the UCC requires a filing m the JUnsdiction where the debtor IS located. Id. § 9-103(3).
157. In addition, gomg to a smgle rule will make it easier for a secured party to
claim a continuously perfected security mterest m proceeds without having to make
a second filing. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 75.
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Further, because debtors change location less often than does
collateral, one consequence of a rule that turns on the location of
the debtor will be a reduction of the burden of alertness presently imposed upon secured parties. 158 No longer will a secured
party run the nsk of losmg its perfected security mterest
through the mterstate shuffling or movement of goods by the
debtor or third parties. 159 Changmg the baseline rule thus may
decrease the secured party's overall costs.
In makmg the case for his mterest group model, Scott may
well be correct when he states that the location of the debtor
rule is "cheaper for a pnmary lender." 160 General financiers,
however, may not be the only wmners if this rule change is
adopted. When facmg a complex task such as predictmg the behavior of buyers and creditors, the absence of systematic and
well-controlled data and a dependence on casually asserted
myths about the system are hinderances.
Consider, for example, the implications of the Study Group's
recommendation for purchasers of discrete goods. Scott assumes
that their costs will mcrease. 161 One rmght, however, conclude
otherwise. Under current section 9-103(1)(d), if a secured party
properly perfects its security mterest under the law of the place
where the collateral is located when the relevant last event
occurs, the ongmal filing remams effective for up to four months
after the debtor takes the goods to another state. 162 If the secured party refiles m the removal state within this statutory
grace penod, the security mterest will contmue perfected without interruption. 163
A maJor consequence of the four-month rule is that fraudulent
debtors can go a long way towards makmg a filing disappear
simply by takmg goods across state lines. An innocent purchaser
wishing to buy the collateral thus must assure herself that the
goods have been m-state for at least four months without a
filing, or she must check (assurmng this mformation can some-

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 76-77.
See infra notes 161-64 and accompanymg text.
Scott, supra note 4, at 1828.
Id.

u.c.c.

§ 9-103(1)(d)(i) (1994).

Id. § 9-103(1)(d)(ii).
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how be obtamed) for a filing m every state where the debtor
does or has done busmess. If a location-of-the-debtor rule becomes effective m the revision of section 9-103(1), this problem,
for the most part, will go away 164
On the one hand, purchasers might mcur greater expenses by
searching for a filing "in a potentially distant location."165 On
the other hand, if the proposed rule change reduces the likelihood that the debtor will be able to mislead purchasers, their
costs might be less. 166 In sum, no one has the data necessary to
draw mtellectually defensible conclusions about ''who wms" and
"who loses" if the Code switches to a location-of-the-debtor rule.
In fact, askmg such a question can easily produce meamngless
or misleading answers.
C. Purchase Money Security Interests
In considenng the Study Group's suggestions concermng purchase money security mterests (PMSI), Scott agam mamtams
that he has uncovered evidence of mterest group power. 167 His
claims about PMSis can be summed up m two related assertions: (1) the direct costs and deficiencies of the filing system
provide an mcentive for pnmary or dominant creditors to opt out
of the system by relymg on pnvate disclosure, 168 and (2) the

164. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 76 ("[D]ebtors are unlikely to change
locations as frequently as collateral does.").
165. Scott, supra note 4, at 1828. Even tlus conclus10n 1s highly speculative. An
obVIous first step m any analyslS of whether a purchaser's costs will mcrease, decrease, or remain the same 1s to study the relevant class to see what percentage of
potential purchasers will actually use the filing system. In some instances, a purchaser would be better off by not searching. See U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (proVIding that a
m15filed financmg statement 15 nonetheless effective "agamst any person who has
knowledge of the contents of such financmg statement"). Second, one must know who
conducts searches (e.g., purchasers, attorneys, or pnvate search firms) and how their
costs compare. Finally, questions remain as to how the choice of filing office affects
those costs. Each issue 1s worthy of senous attention.
166. Even now, a purchaser of goods may have to search for filings where the
debtor 15 located if the goods are "mobile goods" under § 9-103(3) or if the purchaser
1s unsure of their classification. In fact, m the latter case, a prudent purchaser
would be WISe to search where the goods are located (the rule for ordinary goods)
and where the debtor 1s located (the rule for mobile goods).
167. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1832-35.
168. See id. at 1829-32.
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recommendations offered by the Study Group would permit more
of these financial ms1ders to escape from the Code's first-m-time
pnority rule by makmg it easier for them to achieve purchase
money status. 169
This view seems rather confusmg and probably not entirely
consistent. In discussmg the recommendations concermng ch01ce
of law, Scott refers to general financiers as the dommant class of
secured creditors 170 and seems to adopt the Study Group's conclus10n that
the location of the debtor rule has offsetting costs that must
be borne by other creditors, such as purchase money
financers of discrete goods, who must now file m the state
where the debtor is located (which is a more problematic
exercise than filing where the newly acqmred collateral is
located). 171
On this view, 1f understood correctly, no gams by PMSI creditors should result if those gams would be detnmental to the
mterests of pnmary lenders. 172 In contrast, if PMSI creditors
are the ones who exercised the greatest mfluence over the
Study Group, then Scott would have to explam why the suggested conflicts rules look the way that they do. Quite a different possibility 1s that these two mterest groups were m competition. Where, then, are the vague general standards predicted
by Scott's model? 173

169. At the end of lus critique of the PMSI rev1s1ons, Scott claims that "[t]he effects are twofold. First, firms are likely to rely mcreasingly on pnvate disclosure as
a substitute method of policing against debtor rmsbehav1or. Second, the costs of the
filing system are increasingly externalized from pnmary or dormnant creditors to
less informed or 'occasional' creditors." Id. at 1834-35. Scott ignores the fact that, if
the PMSI is m inventory, the PMSI creditor must continue to rely on the filing
system for information about pnor claims because such claimants must receive notice
before delivery of the goods to the debtor. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3).
170. Scott, supra note 4, at 1827.
171. Id. at 1828.
172. Because a PMSI creditor will be able to gam pnority over pnor creditors with
floating liens, U.C.C. § 9-312(3)-(4), a rule that benefits the former will almost always come at the expense of pnmary lenders. This analysis assumes that lenders
who engage m general financmg are not also substantially engaged in purchase
money financing, a conclusion that Scott apparently takes for granted.
173. At one point, Scott does acknowledge that PMSI creditors are in competition
with other creditors and claims that the Study Group's unwillingness to recommend
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Despite the mdispensability of current Judicial and statutory
trends as an mgredient m makmg sense of the Study Group
Report, direct consideration of this data is absent from Scott's
discussion. The Study Group's proposal to revise sections 9301(2) and 9-312(4) to extend the grace period for perfectmg
PMSis from ten to twenty days provides one illustration of how
the absence of this mformation might lead to distorted
mferences. 174 The Final Report explams that "[a]t least 34
states have amended § 9-301(2), § 9-312(4), or both, so as to
extend the 'grace penod' for achieving PMSI priority from 10
days to 20 days. In addition, two states have extended each
period to 15 days and two others have extended each period to
21 days." 175 Irorucally, this trend suggests that, if there is a political story of mterest group pressure to tell, it unfolded across
the country m public, not pnvate legislatures. 176

D. Proceeds
Scott thinks that, like its treatment of PMSis, the Final
Report's treatment of proceeds gives the reader a meanmgful
grasp of the political dynarmc. 177 The purpose of this Article is
not to mterpret the evidence but to illustrate several additional
sorts of evidence-seemingly more than baseless conclusion or
mere anecdote but, on examination, no more mformative. 178

a default formula for the allocation of payments to a creditor with a PMS! and a
non-PMS! security mterest m the same collateral IS consistent with the prediction of
his model. Scott, supra note 4, at 1834 n.155. He does not explam why, if there is
competition among classes of creditors, there are bnght-line rules favorable to PMS!
creditors on other issues. While these are difficult policy questions, his model does
not seem to settle the matter.
174. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 103.
175. Id.
176. Indeed, a pomt rarely written about, but one that Scott must heed, IS that, m
all Article 9 drafts pnor to 1956, the 10-day grace penod was applicable to both mventory and non-mventory PMSls. 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 29.5, at 799 (1965). Therefore, questionmg whether the Code's
treatment of purchase money lenders has improved over time may lead to widely
divergent assertions.
177. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1835 ("Here, the Study Group recommendations
work to enhance the favorable position granted to general financmg creditors by
expanding their ability to mamtam their first-m-time pnority m proceeds.").
178. Answers to most questions about the behavior of the secured credit system are
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What is rmportant to know about the current scope of the
term "proceeds" under section 9-306 is that it has a transactional focus. The secured party obtams a security mterest m anythmg received upon the "sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of' the collateral. 179 Accordingly, courts have taken the
position that the debtor must have transferred title to the collateral before an asset can be classified as proceeds of that collateral. 180 This requirement has led to a senes of dec1s1ons that
have derued. proceeds status to such items as lease payments, 181 cash dividends,182 and vanous kmds of farm
subsidies. 183

mherently statistical. For this reason, the evidence that this Article adds to the
debate permits only the loosest and weakest of mferences about the matters that the
Authors are trymg to understand. Yet illummating the unknowns m the system can
aid m the development of a research agenda for obtammg the good and complete
data needed.
179. u.c.c. § 9-306(1) (1994).
180. See, e.g., In re Hastie, 2 F.3d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[E]ach of the foregomg events describes an event whereby one asset lS disposed of and another is
acqmred as its substitute.").
181. See, e.g., In re Corpus Christi Hotel Partners, Ltd., 133 B.R. 850 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1991); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Cleary Bros. Constr. Co. (In re Cleary
Bros. Constr. Co.), 9 B.R. 40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980). But see Investment Hotel
Properties, Ltd. v. New W. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Investment Hotel Properties, Ltd.), 109 B.R. 990 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (finding that payment for the use
of hotel rooms is proceeds); John Deere Indus. Eqmp. Co. v. Southern Eqmp. Sales
Co. (In re Southern Eqmp. Sales Co.), 24 B.R. 788 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982) (holding
that the term "proceeds" mcludes rents). The Permanent Editonal Board for the
UCC has taken the position that the nght to receive rentals is proceeds.
Where a debtor has granted to a secured party a security mterest m
goods that the debtor later leases as lessor, the lease rentals would constitute proceeds of the secured party's collateral for the reason that the
debtor's conveyance of a leasehold mterest m the goods constitutes a
disposition of the goods for purposes of § 9-306(1).
PEB COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB COMMENTARY NO. 9,
FINAL DRAFT, U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan), at 1 (June 5, 1992).
182. See, e.g., In re Hastie, 2 F.3d 1042. Courts have drawn a distinction between
an ordinary cash dividend and a liqmdating dividend. The latter would seem to be
proceeds. See, e.g., Aycock v. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A., 127 B.R. 17 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1991).
183. Most of the cases m this area have mvolved the federal payment-m-kmd (PIK)
program. Under this program, a farmer agrees not to grow crops on a certain percentage of his land and receives, m exchange for that promise, a governmental payment m kmd of the foregone crops. See In re Sunberg, 729 F.2d 561, 561-62 (8th
Cir. 1984). The question IS whether the PIK payment or payments under similar
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The Final Report proposes a dual conception of proceeds that
would encompass all vaneties of assets. First, the Code would
address the "exchange and replacement'' cases. 184 Proceeds
would mclude anything "received m place of and m substitution
for the ongmal collateral, which has been disposed of or reduced
m value (such as by collections)."185 Under this standard, the
secured party presumably would have a claim to lease rentals
and to the debtor's tort and warranty claims. 186 The second
category of cases are the "close association" cases. 187 These situations would mvolve "all forms of distributions on account of
securities, partnership mterests,
goveTIIment subsidies, and
other payments that do not mvolve an 'exchange."'188 The
Study Group would treat these receipts as proceeds because
they are "so necessarily and obVIously associated with an mterest m the ongmal collateral that a security agreement and
financmg statement ought not to be reqmred to mention them
explicitly "189
Within this area, Scott's argument that general financmg
creditors dommate the Article 9 reVIsIOn process has some mitial
plausibility Adoption of the Study Group recommendations and
the resulting expansion of the conception of proceeds surely will
redound to the benefit of some general financiers and will, as
Scott suggests, have some impact on the mtegrity of the filing
system. 190 As this Article has mdicated, however, the recommendat10ns can be meamngless or rmsleading if exarmned without reference to context. Scott has taken m too little of the pie-

programs are proceeds of the crop that never eXISted. Most courts have held that it
is not. See, e.g., In re Kingsley, 865 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Binmng, 45 B.R.
9 (Bankr. S.D. Oh10 1984).
184. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 110-11.
185. Id. at 110.
186. Id. Although a tort claim nnght qualify as proceeds under section 9-306(1), it
currently could not be the subject of a valid security mterest because Article 9 excludes tort claims. U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (1994). The Study Group has suggested that
Article 9 mclude "security interests m claims (other than claims for personal mJury)
ansmg out of tort, to the extent that such claims are assignable under applicable
non-UCC law." FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 58.
187. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 111.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Scott, supra note 4, at 1836-37.
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ture. To understand the system better, one should consider the
followmg:
1. The Study Group did not go as far as it rmght have. For example, the Final Report reJects the idea that a construction
contractor's accounts might be proceeds of the construction
eqmpment used on the Job. 191 At least one commentator has
cntic1zed tills posit10n as "placmg a formalistic and commercially
unJustified limitation upon the scope of the term 'proceeds."'192

2. D1saggregat1on of the reported cases mto subcategones reveals that the typical proceeds claimant is not the powerful
general financier envisioned by Scott but rather a PMSI or mexpenenced creditor who failed to describe the proceeds m the
security agreement and financmg statement. 193
3. Along with the suggested reconceptualization of the term
"proceeds" are proposals that would confirm and arguably enlarge the protection now afforded to tmrd parties who acqmre
cash proceeds. 194
191. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 111 n.16 ("At some pomt, the acquisition of
assets by a debtor, m part as a result of a dimmution m value of collateral, will be
too attenuated for those assets to be considered proceeds.").
192. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Rethmkmg Proceeds: The History, Misinterpretation and
Revision of the U.C.C. Section 9-306, 69 TUI,. L. REV. 645, 701 (1995) (emphasIS
added).
193. See, e.g., In re Tn-State Eqwp., Inc., 792 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1986); Appliance
Buyers Credit Corp. v. Perrotto Refngeration, Inc. (In re Perrotto Refrigeration, Inc.),
38 B.R. 284 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Territo (In re Territo),
32 B.R. 377 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Rogers, 6 B.R. 472 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa
1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Boston, 564 P.2d 964 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). If the court
does not charactenze a subsequently acquired asset as proceeds, it will nevertheless
be subject to the creditor's security mterest if the security agreement adequately describes it. See U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1994) (permitting a security agreement to provide
for a security mterest m after-acquired collateral). Consider, for example, PIK payments. If a secured party described this property along with the anticipated crops to
be grown, the proceeds issue would never arise. Indeed, even m those mstances m
which the proceeds are outside the scope of Article 9, a secured party can usually
acquire an mterest m the item by some other means. For example, a common-law
assignment of a tort claim may be effective.
194. Courts often apply common-law rules of negotiability to protect good faith
purchasers of cash proceeds. See, e.g., ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Cullen (In re
Antinarelli Enters., Inc.), 94 B.R. 227 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988). Official Comment 2(c)
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4. A statutory expansion of the definition of the term "proceeds"
rmght, m some cases, directly benefit unsecured creditors. For
example, a Mame statute provides that a Judicial lien can reach
the proceeds of a debtor's property only if a secured party would
be able to reach those same proceeds under section 9-306. 195
The preceding sampler should convey the flavor of the problem. Without accurate pictures of the factual underpmnmgs,
debates about the Article 9 revision process cannot proceed
usefully

to current § 9-306 reads:
Where cash proceeds are covered mto the debtor's checkmg account
and paid out m the operation of the debtor's busmess, rec1p1ents of the
funds of course take free of any claim which the secured party may have
m them as proceeds. What has been said relates to payments and transfers m ordinary course.
U.C.C. § 9-306 cmt. 2(c); see also PEB CO!\iMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM COl\iMERCIAL
CODE, PEB CO!\iMENTARIES 1-7, FINAL DRAFT, U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan), at 33
(Mar. 10, 1990) (discussmg the relative pnorities of security mterests m the cash
proceeds of accounts). The Study Group would delete the "ordinary course" limitation
m the comment and revise it to "make clear that a good faith purchaser for value of
cash proceeds or of funds from a deposit account contammg cash proceeds cuts off a
security mterest m the cash proceeds to the extent that the purchaser would take
free of other claims to the property." FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 121-22.
Although the foregomg recommendation may be simply a restatement of current
law, a compamon recommendation may have the effect of changmg it, to the prejudice of the pnmary lender. One common effort m recent years has been to find a
consequence-onented approach for resolving postdefault conflicts between competing
security mterests. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne et al., Junior Creditors' Realization on
Debtors' Equity Under U.C.C. Section 9-311: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 77 GEO.
L.J. 1905 (1989). Although Article 9 explicitly env1s1ons the existence of Jumor security mterests m collateral, see U.C.C. § 9-504(3), it presently is silent on many of
the issues raised m connection with the JUmor creditor's enforcement. One topic that
has generated extensive discussion concerns the 1umor creditor's nght to retam proceeds ansmg from the disposition of collateral under § 9-504 or collections from account debtors and other obligors under § 9-502. The Study Group has proposed that
the JUmor creditor has no obligation to apply the proceeds of collection or other
disposition to a debt secured by a semor lien on the collateral. FINAL REPORT, supra
note 113, at 216-22. Although general prmc1ples of negotiability might Justify this
rule change, it may have a profound impact on developmg case law. See, e.g., Consolidated Equip. Sales, Inc. v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 627 P.2d 432 (Okla.
1981) (finding that a JUmor secured party has an obligation to turn proceeds of the
sale of the collateral over to the semor secured party).
195. See New England Mortgage Servs. Co. v. Petit, 590 A.2d 1054 (Me. 1991) (applymg ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3131(9) (West Supp. 1990)).
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V CONCLUSION
As the foregomg argument demonstrates, the Authors are
uneasy with metatheory that reduces complex human mteraction to the head of a pm. Any assertion of the madequacies of
the commercial lawmakmg process is mappropnate without
cons1denng the realities of that process and without commg to
terms with the JUTisprudential foundations that mform the Umform Commercial Code. This mqmry has revealed the rmprecis10n of Scott's conclus10ns and has suggested that his understanding of the competmg mterests m the Article 9 filing regime
is, at best, mcomplete.
The greatest benefit of theones like the one proposed by Scott
is that they remmd us of the extent to which thinkmg about
commercial law is dependent upon emp1ncally validated models
of the lawmakmg process. 196 The absence of a reliable model of
the behaVIor of the legislative system leaves us m a poor position to evaluate recons1derat10ns of that system. Even if all
agreed on the values and goals of commercial law, no sound
basis exists for concluding that abandomng the current system,
finding ways to make that system more efficient, or retaimng
the current system would make the attainment of those goals
more likely

196. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY
AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 336 (1989) ("To advocate law reforms without a
shred of evidence about how the system currently works, who is likely to be affected, and how those effects may reverberate throughout the system is breathtakmgly
negligent.").

